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Evidence concerning the impact of boards on ﬁrms’ governance and performance remains controversial. We explore the issue of 
board effectiveness by examining the supervisory role boards play and their advisory function. We examine the importance of 
these two roles in high technology contexts and control for the endogenous nature of the representative variables in boards. Our 
paper uses a sample of European ﬁrms to highlight that in high-tech industries the advisory function of boards provides higher 
explanatory power for performance than does the monitoring function, and that larger and less independent boards may improve 
governance and consequently enhance performance.Boards of directors are undoubtedly one of the main mecha-
sms controllingﬁrms.Over thepast 20years, interest in exploring
e efﬁciency andactivities of boardshas been at the core of numer-
relevance andeffectiveness of boardsof directors in large and small,
as well as listed and non-listed companies, in countries all over the
world.
th
ti
r
p
r
in
th
(H
ta
co
b
an
vis studies in the ﬁeld of corporate governance. These papers
ve heralded a fresh desire, in both academic and business cir-
es, to see strong boards of directors, particularly when other
vernance mechanisms are inactive. Studies that address board
fectiveness have run parallel to the papers that tackle gover-
nce in general. The ﬁrst generation of mainly empirical papers,
hich was linked to the Anglo-American business world, assessed
e efﬁcacy of boards of directors within a context marked by a
paration between ownership and management, and by the loss
strength of other governance mechanisms such as corporate
arket control. A second generation of papers transposed these
eas directly to other countries with different institutional and
rporative frameworks. This interest led to the publication of
merous studies, again empirical in nature, which addressed the The authors beneﬁt from the valuable comments of J. Almandoz, I. Aguiar,
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at have at least rekindled interest in understanding the effec-
veness of boards. The impact of these studies is reﬂected in
ecommendations put forward in the Codes of Good Governance
ublished in most developed countries. Recommendations such as
educing board size, including outsider board members, encourag-
g committees on the board and proactive meetings, or separating
e positions of chairman and CEO, are put forward.
Yet, these studies have been criticized for a variety of reasons
ermalin and Weisbach, 2003). First, although it is true that cer-
in consistent empirical tenets seem to have been established, no
ncise models of how boards should behave or function have yet
een found. Thus, studies remain essentially empirical and offer
out-of-equilibrium view. Second and closely linked to the pre-
ous point, certain ﬁndings have been called into question due
the endogenous nature of the links between board character-
tics and efﬁciency. This potential endogeneity complicates any
alysis and makes it hard to interpret with any degree of cer-
inty the relations between board and monitoring, or between
oard and performance. If the endogenous nature of the relations
not taken into account, ﬁndings are not easy to interpret, or, even
orse, may prove wrong. Finally, governance literature focuses on
single function of the board,monitoring, and how conducting this
sk may impact performance, thus neglecting other features more
osely linked to advisory functions. These criticisms have had such
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mn effect on research into boards that a third generation of papers
as now emerged.
This generation is characterized by studies aiming to ﬁll the
urrent theoretical gap, seeking optimal solutions to the problem
f governance by modeling board behavior (Raheja, 2005; Adams
nd Ferreira, 2007; Drymiotes, 2007; Gillette et al., 2008; Hermalin
nd Weisbach, 2007; Harris and Raviv, 2008). Second, other papers
ighlightdifferent board functionsbeyond simplymonitoring, such
s the advisory function. Recent papers have explored the circum-
tances in which each function is more prevalent (Coles et al.,
008; Lasfer, 2006; Adams and Ferreira, 2007; Boone et al., 2007;
rymiotes, 2007; Markarian and Parbonetti, 2007; Cheng, 2008;
inck et al., 2008). Third, econometric techniques have also come
o the fore to provide, at least from the empirical standpoint, solu-
ions to endogeneity problems inherent in relations between the
haracteristics and functioning of boards and performance.
Our paper is close to the second and third group of papers.
ithin that context, we explore how certain ﬁrm featuresmay lead
ot only to enhanced monitoring of managers but also to efﬁcient
dvising.Webase our analysis of this issue on various assumptions:
hat efﬁcient monitoring and advising lead to the creation of value;
hat certain features of the board may help it to effectively under-
ake one speciﬁc function, or another, or both, or one better than
he other; and that the importance of each kind of function also
epends on various characteristics of ﬁrms or the context in which
heyoperate (seeAdamsand Ferreira, 2007; Linck et al., 2008; Coles
t al., 2008). In other words, the relevance of the functions and the
eatures of the board may be determined endogenously by perfor-
ance or by other governance mechanisms, or exogenously by the
rea of business. One of the distinctive features of our paper is that
e specify board effectiveness in monitoring and advising man-
gement according to exogenous factor, the knowledge intensity
f the industry where a ﬁrm works.
Our analysis is conducted from an out-of-equilibrium perspec-
ive since we assume that companies do not adjust their boards
mmediately and efﬁciently. Rather, we suppose that there are
ultiple equilibria dependent on a variety of factors or barriers
xplaining why boards do not adapt when circumstances change,
r at least why they do not change quickly. One of these barriers is
he existence of a Board Code of Conduct in almost all developed
ountries putting pressure on ﬁrms to keep smaller andmore inde-
endent boards. However, this kind of board is not always better
hen, for instance, other board functions, such as the advisory role
re taken into account. A further reason that might inﬂuence the
ynamics of board settings is the corporate ownership structure
nd the conﬂicts of interest generated by voting rights distribution
n theﬁrm.The fragile balanceamongstdirectorsmight also explain
hy board changes are slow or complicated to carry out. Evenmar-
et forces might inﬂuence how boards transform and adapt slowly
o changing circumstances. Moreover, the existence of persistent
mpirical evidence concerning the link between board character-
stics, functioning and performance might prove an indication of
quilibrium. These reasons account for why we posit a relation
etween board characteristics and performance, which is shaped
y the relevance of the monitoring and advising functions.
Our approach requires the use of econometric techniques that
nable us to take account of potential endogeneity problems and
he particular nature of each ﬁrm, those features that make it
istinctive. Thus, our panel data regression uses the generalized
ethod of moments (GMM) that provides efﬁcient solutions to
oth previous questions. Our sample period is 1996–2005. We use
panel of European ﬁrms drawn from the UK, France, Italy, and
pain, totaling 2800 observations. Our ﬁndings highlight that the
ndogenous nature of the factors that deﬁne boards reveals sub-
tantial differences that underscore the contrasting role boards
ay play. In high-technology sectors, that require a greater level ofspeciﬁc know-how and where the advisory role proves more
important than monitoring, both the number of board members as
well as the proportion of insiders (less independence) clearly evi-
dences a positive and signiﬁcant impact on business performance.
By contrast, smaller and more independent boards provide more
efﬁcient governance in contexts in which monitoring prevails over
advising.
This paper is different with respect to the related literature
in three ways. Firstly, it identiﬁes a context where the advising
function is more relevant than the monitoring one because of the
relevance of knowledge in speciﬁc industries (e.g. the high-tech
industry). Unlike other recent papers (Coles et al., 2008; Linck et al.,
2008) that analyze how several variables contribute to strengthen
the advising and/or monitoring function of outsiders, our paper
identiﬁes where the advising function is prevalent and how board
characteristics facilitate carrying out this function. Secondly, our
empirical research assesses and solves the endogeneity problem
using instrumental variables and the GMM estimator. This estima-
tion technique allows eluding the identiﬁcation and speciﬁcation
of the models that describe the behavior of the endogenous vari-
ables. Thirdly, we have broadened the scope of this study to include
countries different from the United States. Our international sam-
ple allows for evaluation if the board advising needs are relevant
in countries where other governance mechanisms work and go
beyond the legal and institutional differences across countries.
The paper is structured as follows. In Section 1we review the lit-
erature on boards of directors and pave the way for the hypotheses
onwhichwebase our empiricalwork. In Section 2we introduce the
data, identify thevariables andsetout themethodused. InSection 3
we present the main ﬁndings of the empirical analysis and assess
the implications. Section 4 concludes.
1. Review of board of directors literature and hypothesis
Many papers that investigate boards of directors explore how
various features or speciﬁc behaviors of the board impact per-
formance, because these features reﬂect the board’s capacity to
discipline management, an action which is central to monitoring.
Underlying this approach is the issue of solving the problems that
arise from the separation of shareholders and management. Man-
agement that enjoysagreaterdegreeof freedommay takedecisions
that elevate its own interests to the detriment of shareholders. By
monitoring and controlling, the board’s key role is to ensure that
this does not happen (John and Senbet, 1998).
The empirical literature on governance highlights that certain
featuresofboardsaremore suited toundertaking this task thanoth-
ers. Numerous papers (Baysinger and Butler, 1985; Yermack, 1996;
Fernandezet al., 1997;Rosenstein andWyatt, 1997;Eisenberget al.,
1998; Klein, 1998) show that due to problems of coordination,
control, and decision-making, oversized boards fail to monitor efﬁ-
ciently. Further, CEOs may use large boards for their own beneﬁt.
This belief has become so deep-rooted that it is hard to ﬁnd any
Code of Good Practices that does not include a recommendation to
reduce the number of board members.
The same is true for board composition, perhaps the most stud-
ied characteristic inpapers aboutboards andcorporate governance.
Conventional wisdom proposes including outside (independent)
board members who can monitor managers’ behavior adequately
without conﬂict of interests. These members can also represent
(minority) shareholders who are not present on the board, defend
the views of other stakeholders, or provide the necessary safe-
guard to restrict management’s discretionary behavior. The logic
behind the idea of including outsiders seems clear, yet the evidence
for this idea isnot. Theﬁndingson linkingboardcomposition toper-
formance remain controversial and far from conclusive. Although
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Table 1
Distribution of number of ﬁrms by countries.
Countries Firms %
France 58 13.33
Italy 154 35.40ertain papers have pointed to a positive link between indepen-
ence and value (Baysinger and Butler, 1985; Rosenstein and
yatt, 1990), others fail to ﬁnd any conclusive evidence or have
ven posited a negative relation (Hermalin and Weisbach, 1991;
hagat andBlack, 1999).1 Nevertheless, including outsiders is a rec-
mmendation found in the majority of good governance practices.
Other issues concern how the board works to improve its per-
ormance. As a means of dealing with the problems that arise from
versized boards, one area which several papers explore, is the
uitability of delegating the monitoring task to smaller commit-
ees which may, depending on the issue in question, be more or
ess independent. In recent years, ﬁrms have set up committees
o deal with such matters as auditing (in many countries audit-
ng committees are compulsory), appointments, remunerations, or
trategy. There is some evidence in favor of committees as a means
f enhancing the advisory role of the board (Klein, 1998). Another
rea to come under scrutiny has been the frequency of board meet-
ngs to discuss and decidewhich direction the ﬁrm should take. The
imited amount of available evidence seems to point to the belief
hat more frequent meetings are a reaction to poor company per-
ormance, rather than a desire to monitor and safeguard against
oor results (Vafeas, 1999).
Monitoring and controlling managers are the board’s main role,
hich does not of course imply that boards do not have other
asks to perform. Part of the board’s job and that of its individual
embers are to assist, encourage, and advise management on the
unning of the ﬁrm by setting goals, assessing investment opportu-
ities, and so on, and by making available to management both the
eneral and speciﬁc knowledge individuals possess as board mem-
ers. Recentpapers, suchas thosebyHellandandSykuta (2004) and
dams and Ferreira (2007), stress the importance of this function.
hese authors argue that on some occasions the advisory function
revails over the supervisory role.
Bearing this fresh viewpoint in mind, some of the previously
tated hypotheses may be reconsidered or redeﬁned. For instance,
f the advisory function is considered to be more important, then
aving a larger and less independent board should not prove a
tumbling block. This increase would obviously be a reasonable
ypothesis if agreaternumberofboardmembers impliedenhanced
nowledge and ability to advise. Furthermore, depending on the
nowledge required and the kind of business in question, a greater
umber ofmanagers (insiders) should have no adverse effect. Inso-
ar as insiders may have access to more information and a deeper
nderstanding of the business, making this knowledge available to
he board (and the outsiders)may help it perform its rolemore efﬁ-
iently and create greater value for the ﬁrm (Adams and Ferreira,
007; Harris and Raviv, 2008).
As Adams and Ferreira (2007) posit, there is a trade-off between
he two functions of a board. If managers provide board members
ith information, then the board may in turn be able to advise
hemanagersmore efﬁciently. Nevertheless, such informationmay
lso determine which options are available to the board and thus
llow the board to interfere in managers’ decisions. The CEO may
e reluctant to disclose too much information if the board is highly
ndependent from management. The importance of either moni-
oring or advisingmay determinewhich kind of board provesmore
fﬁcient for the ﬁrm, the more independent board that undertakes
1 We have conﬁned ourselves to citing just a few of the works exploring the link
etween board composition and value. Many others approach the impact of inde-
endence by other means. For instance, Weisbach (1988) ﬁnds favorable evidence
o the effect that ﬁrms whose boards comprise a majority of independent mem-
ers are able to perform certain speciﬁc tasks such as replacing the CEO much more
ffectively, or Rosenstein and Wyatt (1990), who partially show that share prices
ncrease when an independent member is appointed to the board. Listing each and
very one of these works would prove impossible.Spain 75 17.24
United Kingdom 148 34.02
Total 435 100
stricter monitoring, or the less independent that advises manage-
ment. This twofold function may ultimately lead to a trade-off
between board (in)dependence and the supply of information that
could lead the board to carry out its mission more efﬁciently and
create more value.
Determining when one particular function proves more impor-
tant than the other is central to our research. We assume that the
advisory role couldbemorevaluable in contextswhere information
and knowledge are key point of business, as high-tech industries.
Such industries demand a high degree of speciﬁc knowledge, either
because of the complex nature of the production process, R&D
intensity, or the difﬁculty involved in processing information. In
suchﬁrms, the boards of directors play a key role in putting forward
valuable suggestions aimed at running the business, determin-
ing strategy, or interpreting business opportunities (Adams and
Ferreira, 2007; Coles et al., 2008). In these contexts, any increase in
thenumberof boardmemberswouldnotproveharmful if itwere to
providemanagementwith useful advice. A less independent board,
with more insiders, would not be inadvisable if it is able to share
more and better information with the outsiders, and conducts to
advise management efﬁciently. Depending on which information
must ﬂow from managers to advisors and vice versa, and how rel-
evant that information is to running the business, a board with a
greater (smaller) percentage of insiders (outsiders) would prove
more suitable (Linck et al., 2008; Harris and Raviv, 2008). In such
circumstances a highly independent board might even prove quite
harmful to the ﬁrm.2
As a result, we test the following hypothesis: In high-tech sec-
tors, the advisory role of the board becomes more important than
monitoring, such that (1) there is a positive link between per-
formance and board size; (2) there is a negative link between
performance and board independence; and (3) there is a positive
link between performance and number of board meetings.
In short, the traditional hypotheses on the board characteristics
needed to efﬁciently monitor management must be redeﬁned to
take account of the advisory role. Underlying this approach is the
idea that the nature of the board reveals its capacity, or indeed its
willingness, to monitor and advise efﬁciently, and that the latter
function prevails in ﬁrms operating in knowledge-intense sectors.
This double function might enable us to account, at least in part, for
the conﬂictingﬁndings to emerge in governance literature address-
ing the impact of board structure and value.
2. Sample, variables, and econometric approach
2.1. DataThe sample comprises individualized data from nonﬁnancial
listed ﬁrms.We obtain our data from the Compustat, Amadeus, and
Spencer Stuart Boards Index databases. Our sample covers Spain,
2 With regard to this question, Adams and Ferreira (2007) alert to the problems
arising from the excessive pressure exerted on ﬁrms to appoint highly independent
boards. Taken toextremesand in certain circumstances, amainly independentboard
might actually be destroying value. In a further approach to the question, Almazan
and Suarez (2003) evidence the advantages of having a less independent board in
certain circumstances, in their case, CEO entrenchment.
Table 2
Distribution of ﬁrms by sectors. Standard industrial classiﬁcation division structure.
Divisions Firms %
Division A: agriculture, forestry,
and ﬁshing
1 0.002
Division B: mining 8 2.37
Division C: construction 16 4.74
Division D: manufacturing 160 47.47
Division E: transportation,
communications, electric, gas,
and sanitary services
67 19.88
Division F: wholesale trade 9 2.67
Division G: retail trade 31 9.19
Division H: ﬁnance, insurance,
and real estate
4 1.18
Division I: services 37 10.97
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Table 3
1997 NAICS codes constituting high-technology industries.
NAICS code Industry
32411 Petroleum reﬁneries
3251 Basic chemical manufacturing
3252 Resin, synthetic rubber, and artiﬁcial and synthetic ﬁbers
and ﬁlaments manufacturing
3253 Pesticide, fertilizer, and other agricultural chemical
manufacturing
3254 Pharmaceutical and medicine manufacturing
3255 Paint, coating, and adhesive manufacturing
3256 Soap, cleaning compound, and toilet preparation
manufacturing
3259 Other chemical product and preparation manufacturing
332992 Ordnance and accessories manufacturing—small arms
ammunition manufacturing
332993 Ordnance and accessories manufacturing—ammunition
(except small arms) manufacturing
332994 Ordnance and accessories manufacturing—small arms
manufacturing
332995 Ordnance and accessories manufacturing—other ordnance
and accessories manufacturing
3331 Agriculture, construction, and mining machinery
manufacturing
3332 Industrial machinery manufacturing
3333 Commercial and service industry machinery
manufacturing
3336 Engine, turbine, and power transmission equipment
manufacturing
3339 Other general purpose machinery manufacturing
3341 Computer and peripheral equipment manufacturing
3342 Communications equipment manufacturing
3343 Audio and video equipment manufacturing
3344 Semiconductor and other electronic component
manufacturing
3345 Navigational, measuring, electromedical, and control
instruments manufacturing
3346 Manufacturing and reproducing magnetic and optical
media
3353 Electrical equipment manufacturing
33599 All other electrical equipment and component
manufacturing
3361 Motor vehicle manufacturing
3362 Motor vehicle body and trailer manufacturing
3363 Motor vehicle parts manufacturing
3364 Aerospace product and parts manufacturing
3391 Medical equipment and supplies manufacturing
5112 Software publishers
514191 On-line information services
5142 Data processing services
5413 Architectural, engineering, and related services
5415 Computer systems design and related services
5416 Management, scientiﬁc, and technical consulting services
5417 Scientiﬁc research and development servicesDivision J: public administration 4 1.18
337 100
rance, Italy, and the UK for the 1996–2005 period. Tables 1 and 2
how the distribution of the ﬁrms in the sample by sectors and
ountries. The initial sample ismade up of 435 ﬁrms and comprises
800 observations.
We ﬁlter the sample in several ways to ensure coherence in the
roposed variables. We remove those observations with their own
egative equity, and those with unusual extremes in the market
nd book value of their equity, in total assets or turnover. We also
emove ﬁrms whose market value of shares is more than 20 times
heir book value.
.2. Variables
Our dependent variable is a value-creation measure. We cal-
ulate it through the ﬁnancial Q, as deﬁned in the following
xpression:
i,t =
SMVi,t + TDi,t
SBVi,t + TDi,t
(1)
here SMV is the market value of the shares, SBV is the book value
f the shares, and TD is the book value of total debt. In all cases, our
ample observations refer to ﬁrm i and to period t.
For the independent variables, we ﬁrst include three variables
hat represent board composition and activity. Thus, LNBOASIZEi,t
s the natural logarithm of the total number of board mem-
ers, OUTPROi,t measures the proportion that outsiders represent
ut of the total number of board members, and LNMEYEARi,t
epresents the natural logarithm of the number of meetings held
ach year by the board.
When verifying the impact of speciﬁc board characteristics and
ehavior on ﬁrm performance, it is essential to know which of the
wo basic functions, controlling or advising, prevails in each sit-
ation. To achieve this, there are certain exogenous factors that
elp us to characterize boards of directors and to shed some light
n the controversial link between the nature and behavior of a
oard and ﬁrmperformance. One of these is the nature of the ﬁrm’s
usiness. According to its nature, the ﬁrm will require a higher or
ower levelof speciﬁcknowledge.Knowledge-basedbusinessactiv-
ty tends to be found in high-tech sectors. To pinpoint these sectors,
he U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) drew up a list of high-tech
ectors based on the Standard Industrial Classiﬁcation (SIC) codes
n 1999 (Hecker, 1999). However, the data published in the 2006
tate Indicators are taken from the conversion of the SIC list of
odes to the 1997 North American Industrial Classiﬁcation System
NAICS). Table 3 shows the NAICS codes, which cover 39 categories.
hese categories are converted to SIC codes through a convergence
able for the two classiﬁcation systems (Hecker, 1999). Using this
lassiﬁcation, we construct a dummy variable (HT) that takes the6117 Educational support services
811212 Computer and ofﬁce machine repair and maintenance
Science and Engineering Indicators 2006.
value one when the ﬁrm belongs to a high-tech sector, and zero
otherwise.
As control variables, we consider the level of debt (DTABi,t),
which we deﬁne as the quotient between total debt and assets;
the size of the ﬁrm (LNTABi,t), which we deﬁne as the natural loga-
rithm of the total value of assets; and the existence of a controlling
shareholder with enough incentives to monitor the managers. We
construct a dummy variable (CONTROLLER) that takes the value of
one if over 25% of the average ownership is in the hands of the
main shareholder during the period for which observations exist
for a speciﬁc ﬁrm, and zero otherwise. We also use dummy vari-
ables that allocate each ﬁrm to a speciﬁc business sector (SECTOR)
or a speciﬁc country (COUNTRY), and also assign each observa-
tion to a speciﬁc year (YEAR). For allocation to a business sector,
we use the SIC code obtained from the Compustat database, the
main groups of which appear in Table 2. Therefore, the SECTORj
variable, j ranging from one to ten, is a dummy variable that takes
Table 4
Statistics. This table shows the mean, median, standard deviation, minimum, and maximum values of the following variables: board size (BOASIZE), number and proportion
of outside directors (OUTSIDERS and OUTPRO), number of meetings per year (MEYEAR), leverage ratio (DTAB), Tobin’s Q proxy (Q), total assets in US $ millions (TAB), share
market value in US $millions (SMV), and average percentage of shares in the hands of themain shareholder (C1).We calculate all values from the 2800 ﬁrm-year observations
for non-ﬁnancial companies in France, the UK, Italy, and Spain from 1996 to 2005.
Mean Median Std. dev. Minimum Maximum
BOASIZE 11.3761 11.000 3.5011 4.000 26.000
OUTSIDERS 8.2032 8.000 3.5129 0.000 21.000
OUTPRO 0.7169 0.7272 0.1669 0.000 1.000
MEYEAR 8.2906 8.000 3.6642 1.000 45.000
DTAB 0.2618 0.2652 0.1367 0.000 0.7482
Q 2.3255 1.5055 4.3051 0.4635 118.4732
TAB 9479.86 2826.00 20211.78 16.00 206914.00
SMV 7649.65 2044.92 19029,46 17.33 219509.04
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*C1 0.2789 0.1741
CONTROLLER 0.4847 0
HT 0.1910 0
he value one when the ﬁrm belongs to sector j, and zero other-
ise. The COUNTRYk variable, where k ranges between one and
our, takes the value one when the ﬁrm belongs to country k, and
ero otherwise. YEARm is a dummy variable that takes the value
ne when the sample observation corresponds to year m, and zero
therwise.
Table 4 shows the main characteristics of the sample. When we
ocus on the key variables, we see that one prominent feature is the
ean value of ﬁrm performance in the sample, which has a Q value
atio equal to 2.32 (themedian is 1.5). As regards the characteristics
f the boards of directors, the mean number of board members is
1.37 (themedian is 11), and the distribution between insiders and
utsiders yields mean values of 3.06 (the median is 3) and 8.2 (the
edian is 8), respectively. The mean percentage participation of
nsiders on the board is thus 28.31% (the median is 27.27%), but
or outsiders the ﬁgure reaches 71.69% (the median is 72.72%). The
ean value for the number of annual board meetings is 8.29 with a
edian of 8.With respect to other variables, we note that themean
evel of debt is 26.18%, and the median percentage of shares that
he main shareholder reaches is 17.41%.
able 5
q. (2): GMM estimation. We report the two-step GMM system estimator (SE). The depe
LNBOASIZE), proportion of outside directors (OUTPRO), log of meetings per year (LNM
ime dummies. P> |z| of estimated coefﬁcients are in parentheses. The Hansen test is dist
oefﬁcients. Estimations in columns (2)–(4) include country, sector, and year dummies.
Dependent variable: Q (1) (
LNBOASIZE −3.1609 −
(0.000)*** (
OUTPRO 2.0293 4
(0.000)*** (
LNMEYEAR 1.2062 0
(0.000)*** (
DTAB −5.608 −
(0.000)*** (
LNTAB −0.0942 −
(0.013)** (
Cons 8.1786 1
(0.000)*** (
Country dummies (sig.) Y
Sector dummies (sig.)
Year dummies (sig.)
Wald test 2211.29 1
(0.000)*** (
AR (1) 1.05 1
(0.293) (
AR (2) 0.96 0
(0.337) (
Hansen test 75.7 1
(0.488) (
Signiﬁcant at 10% level.
** Signiﬁcant at 5% level.
*** Signiﬁcant at 1% level.0.2531 0.02 1.000
0.4999 0 1
0.3932 0 1
2.3. Econometric approach
To test our hypotheseswehave constructed a basic econometric
model for estimation. Our main objective is to assess performance
by examining speciﬁc features of board behavior, such as the total
number ofmembers, proportion of outsiders, and annual frequency
of meetings. As control variables we include debt, size, and dummy
variables that represent the sector, country, and year of observa-
tion. All of these factors combine to produce Eq. (2):
Qi,t = ˛ + ˇ1 · LNBOASIZEi,t + ˇ2 · OUTPROi,t + ˇ3 · LNMEYEARi,t
+ ˇ4 · DTABi,t + ˇ5 · LNTABi,t +
9∑
j=1
j · SECTORj+
3∑
k=1
ık · COUNTRYk +
9∑
m=1
m · YEARm + i + εi,t (2)
ndent variable is Tobin’s Q proxy (Q). Explanatory variables are: log of board size
EYEAR), leverage ratio (DTAB), size of the ﬁrm (LNTAB), and country, sector, and
ributed following a 2 function with as many degrees of freedom as the estimated
2) (3) (4)
3.844 −3.1777 −1.766
0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)***
.6421 1.6367 1.1093
0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.012)**
.3728 0.5516 0.9025
0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)***
4.2347 −3.015 −2.3587
0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)***
0.5664 −0.2194 0.0407
0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.405)
2.6996 8.122 3.9
0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)***
es
Yes
Yes
457.92 749.98 1432.28
0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)***
.07 1.07 −0.43
0.284) (0.284) (0.67)
.96 0.95 0.83
0.337) (0.343) (0.405)
14.93 70.95 56.33
0.162) (0.348) (0.821)
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ynall the equations, the subscript i refers to theﬁrmand t to the time
eriod. i represents the nonobservable ﬁxed effects, constant over
ime and linked to each ﬁrm in the sample. εi,t, is the random dis-
urbance and fulﬁlls all the usual conditions of the classical linear
egression model. To avoid multicollinearity problems, we intro-
uce the dummy variables representing sector, country, and year
lternatively in the estimation of the model.
In the next estimation we include the variable that allows us to
dentify cases inwhich the advisory role of theboard ismore impor-
ant than the monitoring function. Such variable is the dummy
ariable HT that takes the value of 1 when the ﬁrm belongs to
high-tech industry and 0 otherwise. To verify possible changes
n the size of the coefﬁcient for the explanatory variables related to
he board in ﬁrms belonging to high-tech sectors, we include the
ariable HT interactively. The new regression model we estimate is
q. (3):
i,t = ˛ + ˇ1 · LNBOASIZEi,t + ˇ1HT · LNBOASIZEi,t · HTi,t
+ ˇ2 · OUTPROi,t + ˇ2HT · OUTPROi,t · HTi,t
+ ˇ3 · LNMEYEARi,t + ˇ3HT · LNMEYEARi,t · HTi,t
+ ˇ4 · DTABi,t + ˇ5 · LNTABi,t + DUMMYVAR + i + εi,t (3)
able 6
q. (3). GMM estimation. We report the two-step GMM system estimator (SE). The depe
LNBOASIZE), proportion of outside directors (OUTPRO), log of meetings per year (LNMEY
ummies. The HT dummy is included interactively. It takes the value of one if the ﬁrm b
f the estimator for the reference group plus the interactive impact on the estimator of t
ansen test is distributed following a 2 function with as many degrees of freedom as the
ear dummies.
Dependent variable: Q (1) (
LNBOASIZE −1.2776 −
(0.000)*** (
LNBOASIZE*HT 2.1928 1
(0.000)*** (
 0.9151 1
(0.000)*** (
OUTPRO 1.6805 1
(0.000)*** (
OUTPRO*HT −5.2210 −
(0.000)*** (
 −3.5404 −
(0.000)*** (
LNMEYEAR 0.0938 0
(0.336) (
LNMEYEAR*HT −0.7553 −
(0.001)*** (
 −0.6614 −
(0.003)*** (
DTAB −4.9930 −
(0.000)*** (
LNTAB −0.1507 −
(0.001)*** (
Cons 6.3194 6
(0.000)*** (
Country dummies (sig.) Y
Sector dummies (sig.)
Year dummies (sig.)
Wald test 1610.06 1
(0.000)*** (
AR (1) 1.08 1
(0.281) (
AR (2) 0.95 0
(0.340) (
Hansen test 185.56 1
(0.693) (
* Signiﬁcant at 10% level.
** Signiﬁcant at 5% level.
*** Signiﬁcant at 1% level.Operating:
Qi,t = ˛ + (ˇ1 · +ˇ1C · HTi,t) · LNBOASIZEi,t
+ (ˇ2 + ˇ2C · HTi,t) · OUTPROi,t .
+ (ˇ3 + ˇ3C · HTi,t) · LNMEYEARi,t + ˇ4 · DTABi,t
+ ˇ5 · LNTABi,t + DUMMYVAR + i + εi,t
The residual term is divided into two terms in each of the equa-
tions. The ﬁrst, εi,t, covers all the other factors that impact business
performance in anyway, andwhich are not identiﬁed in the econo-
metric model. This term constitutes the random disturbance and
fulﬁls the usual conditions of the classical linear regression model.
Nevertheless, the ﬁxed effects linked to each ﬁrm (i), and possibly
correlated with the set of explanatory variables, and which might
cause signiﬁcant biases in the estimation, tend to be found within
the error term. It is possible not only to identify this constant unob-
servable heterogeneity but also to eliminate it. We do so by using
the estimation of a ﬁrst differencesmodel, as it enables such effects
to be removed and yields non-biased and efﬁcient estimators of the
effect of the independent variables on business performance.Despite all these measures, if the hypothesis of strict exogene-
ity of explanatory variables is not fulﬁlled, it may lead to a serious
problem in the proposed models. In our case, since we are dealing
with variables that represent the board of directors, there is certain
ndent variable is Tobin’s Q proxy (Q). Explanatory variables are: log of board size
EAR), leverage ratio (DTAB), size of the ﬁrm (LNTAB), and country, sector, and time
elongs to a high-tech sector, and zero otherwise.  assesses the joint signiﬁcance
he group of high-tech ﬁrms. P> |z| of estimated coefﬁcients are in parentheses. The
estimated coefﬁcients. Estimations in columns (2)–(4) include country, sector, and
2) (3) (4)
0.8415 −1.4499 −1.2940
0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)***
.9187 2.2555 2.0820
0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)***
.0772 0.8055 0.7880
0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)***
.4439 1.8034 1.6720
0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.009)***
4.8237 −5.5252 −4.7690
0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)***
3.3798 −3.7218 −3.0970
0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)***
.1157 −0.0338 0.1217
0.244) (0.748) (0.290)
0.4691 −0.3188 −0.7293
0.024)** (0.054)* (0.000)***
0.3533 −0.2850 −0.6075
0.099)* (0.021)** (0.000)***
4.6319 −3.9730 −5.0836
0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)***
0.2542 −0.2743 −0.1523
0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)***
.1134 7.2463 0.1290
0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.931)
es
Yes
Yes
058.13 1390.44 3075.85
0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)***
.08 1.09 1.05
0.280) (0.277) (0.296)
.95 0.96 0.98
0.341) (0.339) (0.330)
89.23 174.42 167.65
0.543) (0.719) (0.842)
Table 7
Eq. (2). GMM estimation by sub-samples depending on HT. We report the two-step GMM system estimator (SE). The dependent variable is Tobin’s Q proxy (Q). Explanatory
variables are: log of board size (LNBOASIZE), proportion of outside directors (OUTPRO), log of meetings per year (LNMEYEAR), leverage ratio (DTAB), size of the ﬁrm (LNTAB),
and country, sector, and time dummies. Estimation of column (1) corresponds to the subsample of ﬁrms for which HT equals one (knowledge intensive). Column (2)
corresponds to the subsample of ﬁrms for which HT equals zero. P> |z| of estimated coefﬁcients are in parentheses. The Hansen test is distributed following a 2 function
with as many degrees of freedom as the estimated coefﬁcients.
HT=1 HT=0
LNBOASIZE −1.7520 −2.1191 0.4335 −0.7269 −1.0274 −1.2389
(0.747) (0.620) (0.877) (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)***
OUTPRO −5.6664 −4.5555 −3.9220 1.4628 1.3120 0.9281
(0.071)* (0.035)** (0.077)* (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.004)***
LNMEYEAR −0.4433 −0.2891 −1.0848 −0.3993 −0.2910 −0.1452
(0.801) (0.864) (0.364) (0.001)*** (0.033)** (0.303)
DTAB −9.9740 −10.2298 −7.4482 −3.7422 −3.2501 −3.2506
(0.010)*** (0.000)*** (0.003)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)***
LNTAB 0.0808 0.2746 −0.0685 −0.1553 −0.1203 −0.1226
(0.867) (0.408) (0.767) (0.000)*** (0.019)** (0.002)***
Cons 13.9544 11.8051 7.8452 5.5434 5.6192 1.8137
(0.299) (0.277) (0.250) (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.259)
Country Yes Yes
Industry Yes Yes
Year Yes Yes
Wald test 27.13 50.53 6.38 349.53 251.32 618.02
(0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000) (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)
AR (1) 1.01 1.01 1.00 0.51 0.53 0.37
(0.311) (0.318) (0.316) (0.608) (0.598) (0.715)
AR (2) 0.98 0.98 0.98 −0.32 −0.31 −0.44
(0.326) (0.328) (0.329) (0.750) (0.753) (0.657)
Hansen test 7.87 9.33 7.52 141.26 119.59 112.20
(0.795) (0.674) (821) (0.017)* (0.113) (0.252)
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c* Signiﬁcant at 10% level.
** Signiﬁcant at 5% level.
*** Signiﬁcant at 1% level.
heoretical and empirical evidence to suggest possible endogene-
ty (Hermalin and Weisbach, 2003). Failing to take this concern
nto account in the estimation might lead to major shortcomings
nd to obtaining inconsistent estimators.3 The generalized method
f moments (GMM) estimator developed by Arellano and Bond
1991) addresses this problem allowing endogenous variables in
rst differences to be instrumented with suitable lags of their own
evels.4 By using the GMM method we can build instruments for
hose variables (board size, composition, number of meetings and
ebt) that are potentially endogenous. In this case, we use the
wo-stepsystemestimatorwithadjustedstandarderrors forpoten-
ial heteroskedasticity proposed by Arellano and Bond (1998). In
ddition to correcting problems of simultaneity and measuring
roblems, the two-step estimator provides a structure of residuals
hat are robust to autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity problems
nd increase the efﬁciency of the original ﬁrst-differences estima-
or.
To test model speciﬁcation validity, we calculate the Hansen
est of over-identifying restrictions. This test examines the lack of
orrelation between the instruments and the error term. The AR
1) and AR (2) statistics measure ﬁrst- and second-degree serial
orrelations. Given the use of ﬁrst-difference transformations, we
xpect some degree of ﬁrst-order serial correlation, although this
orrelation does not invalidate our results. However, the presence
f second-order serial correlationdoes signal omitted variables.We
lso calculate the Wald test of joint signiﬁcance for all independent
ariables.
3 Although the available theoretical and empirical evidence seem to be enough
o deal with the potential endogeneity problems, we examined the correlation
etween the change in board characteristics and the change in the dependent vari-
ble (Chi, 2005). In general, this test reveals that exist correlation between board
haracteristic changes and performance changes, especially in contemporaneous
erms and such correlations lose signiﬁcance when more board change lags are
onsidered.
4 Usually, the used lags range between 2 and 4.3. Results
3.1. Results from basic and multiplicative models
Our ﬁrst analysis deals with the traditional assessment of board
features (size, independence, and number of meetings) as determi-
nants of business performance. In Table 5we show themain results
of Eq. (2) estimation, the basic model of board-performance rela-
tion. In column (1), our ﬁndings show a negative and signiﬁcant
impact of the logarithm of the number of board members, and a
positive and signiﬁcant impact for the proportion of outsiders and
for the number of meetings on value. The signs prove robust when
we includedummyvariables that represent the country, sector, and
year to which each sample observation belongs (columns (2)–(4)).
These ﬁndings support the common idea that large boards are
linked to poor performance, and concur with the ﬁndings in other
papers such as Yermack (1996), Fernandez et al. (1997), Eisenberg
et al. (1998), andHuther (1997). An enhanced capacity tomonitor is
balanced by problems inherent in large scale board set-ups. These
problems can include such difﬁculties as those in communication
and coordination amongst members, and free riding. By contrast, a
greaterpresenceof outsiders, and therefore ahigherdegreeof inde-
pendence, does seemto lead to improvedperformance. Thepositive
sign for the number of board meetings held every year evidences
a proactive function, such that more intense monitoring (or advis-
ing) is reﬂected in enhanced performance. Both debt and size show
a negative link with performance. The four cases also show that the
modelsweestimate are statistically signiﬁcant (Wald test). Further,
the GMMspeciﬁcation proves valid, as no second-order correlation
exists (AR (2) test). Moreover, the Hansen test conﬁrms the validity
of the tools used in the estimation.
Once the basic model is estimated our main goal is to ascer-
tain whether there are any differences in the links assessed when
we take into account circumstances where not only monitoring
but also advising is relevant. Although the two functions can co-
exist and might complement each other in boards of directors,
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*anagersmay strike a trade-off between the advantages anddraw-
acks implicit indisclosing relevant information toboardmembers.
n such cases, shareholders could tip the balance in favor of onepar-
icular function or another, depending on certain features of the
rm or the setting (Adams and Ferreira, 2007; Coles et al., 2008;
arris and Raviv, 2008). Thus, we consider the case in which the
rm conducts its business activity in an area where acquiring and
assing on highly specialized knowledge prove particularly valu-
ble to the managers. Therefore, for ﬁrms in which information
rom managers can be especially valuable, boards would comprise
greater number of insiders and control by the latter would be
eneﬁcial (Harris and Raviv, 2008). This situation is particularly
mportant for ﬁrms in high-technology sectors.
We assess this circumstance using the previously deﬁned HT
ategory variable in the estimations. Our interest lies not so much
n ascertaining the impact of belonging to a high-tech sector on
usiness performance, but rather in analyzing possible changes
n the link between the features of the board and performance
n different industries. Thus, we include the HT category variable
nteractivelywith the relevant variables in the analysis andweesti-
ate Eq. (3). The results in Table 6 evidence signiﬁcant changes
nd remain robust when we include the impact of country, sec-
or, or time. In all cases the estimation of the equations prove
able 8
q. (3): GMM estimation with ownership concentration. We report the two-step GMM s
ariables are: log of board size (LNBOASIZE), proportion of outside directors (OUTPRO)
everage ratio (DTAB), size of the ﬁrm (LNTAB), and country, sector, and time dummies. Th
high-tech sector, and zero otherwise.  assesses the joint signiﬁcance of the estimator f
igh-tech ﬁrms. P> |z| of estimated coefﬁcients are in parentheses. The Hansen test is dist
oefﬁcients. Estimations in columns (1)–(3) include country, sector, and year dummies.
Dependent variable: Q (1)
LNBOASIZE −0.3630
(0.021)**
LNBOASIZE*HT 1.6915
(0.000)***
 1.3285
(0.000)***
OUTPRO 1.3055
(0.000)***
OUTPRO*HT −4.4056
(0.000)***
 −3.1001
(0.000)***
LNMEYEAR −0.0691
(0.513)
LNMEYEAR*HT −0.2694
(0.038)**
 −0.3386
(0.003)***
CONTROLLER 0.5200
(0.003)***
DTAB −4.4022
(0.000)***
LNTAB −0.2733
(0.000)***
Cons 5.2479
(0.000)***
Country dummies (sig.) Yes
Sector dummies (sig.)
Year dummies (sig.)
Wald test 767.23
(0.000)***
AR (1) 1.09
(0.277)
AR (2) 0.95
(0.342)
Hansen test 190.65
(0.493)
Signiﬁcant at 10% level.
** Signiﬁcant at 5% level.
*** Signiﬁcant at 1% level.statistically signiﬁcant, and the values of the AR (2) and Hansen
tests reﬂect the validity of the tools used in the GMM. The coef-
ﬁcients of the interactive variables show signiﬁcant variations in
the link between performance and board structure. We note the
coefﬁcient of the interactive variable (OUTPRO*HT) refers to
the incremental effect of board composition on the performance
of ﬁrms belonging to high-tech sectors compared to the reference
group of ﬁrms in no high-tech sectors. The OUTPRO estimator pro-
vides informationonnohigh-techﬁrms.assesses the signiﬁcance
of the estimator for the group of ﬁrms in high-tech industries.
The results show that board size has a positive, signiﬁcant
impact on business performance for HT ﬁrms, whereas board
independence, expressed through the proportion of outsiders
(OUTPRO), proves a negative factor for ﬁrms in high-tech industries
and positive or non-signiﬁcant for all other ﬁrms. Coles et al. (2008)
obtain similar evidence, distinguishing between ﬁrms involved
in intense R+D or not, supporting the proposal of Klein (1998)
and Raheja (2005). Our ﬁndings conﬁrm the differing impact of
the variables most representative of the board on one group
of ﬁrms or another, highlighting the different roles boards of direc-
tors may play. The presence of board members who have some link
with the ﬁrm is well received, and advising management is wel-
comed in complex environments requiring a high degree of speciﬁc
ystem estimator (SE). The dependent variable is Tobin’s Q proxy (Q). Explanatory
, log of meetings per year (LNMEYEAR), ownership concentration (CONTROLLER),
e HT dummy is included interactively. It takes the value of one if the ﬁrm belongs to
or the reference group plus the interactive impact on the estimator of the group of
ributed following a 2 function with as many degrees of freedom as the estimated
(2) (3)
−0.8942 −0.8831
(0.035)** (0.000)***
2.0906 2.0594
(0.000)*** (0.000)***
1.1963 1.1763
(0.000)*** (0.000)***
1.1582 0.8650
(0.001)*** (0.033)**
−5.2508 −4.8396
(0.000)*** (0.000)***
−4.0925 −3.9745
(0.000)*** (0.000)***
−0.0970 0.0538
(0.394) (0.609)
−0.1923 −0.6230
(0.265) (0.611)
−0.2894 −0.5691
(0.011)** (0.021)**
0.7699 0.1435
(0.000)*** (0.402)
−3.9548 −4.8044
(0.000)*** (0.000)***
−0.2824 −0.1570
(0.000)*** (0.000)***
6.2448 2.5909
(0.000)*** (0.038)**
Yes
Yes
2001.99 4118.59
(0.000)*** (0.000)***
1.09 1.04
(0.275) (0.297)
0.95 0.95
(0.340) (0.344)
172.32 169.61
(0.739) (0.800)
Table 9
Eq. (3): GMM estimation with INSOUT. We report the two-step GMM system estimator (SE). The dependent variable is Tobin’s Q proxy (Q). Explanatory variables are: log of
board size (LNBOASIZE), proportion of insiders over outsiders (INSOUT), log of meetings per year (LNMEYEAR), leverage ratio (DTAB), size of the ﬁrm (LNTAB), and country,
sector, and time dummies. The HT dummy is included interactively. It takes the value of one if the ﬁrm belongs to a high-tech sector, and zero otherwise.  assesses the
joint signiﬁcance of the estimator for the reference group plus the interactive impact on the estimator of the group of high-tech ﬁrms. P> |z| of estimated coefﬁcients are in
parentheses. The Hansen test is distributed following a 2 function with as many degrees of freedom as the estimated coefﬁcients. Estimations in columns (1)–(3) include
country, sector, and year dummies.
Dependent variable: Q (1) (2) (3)
LNBOASIZE −0.9243 −1.0698 −0.9753
(0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)***
LNBOASIZE*HT −0.6324 0.6631 0.7591
(0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.022)**
 −0.2919 −0.4066 −0.2161
(0.080)* (0.023)** (0.171)
INSOUT −0.3978 −0.4048 −0.3636
(0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)***
INSOUT*HT 1.7393 1.8490 1.3194
(0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)***
 1.3114 1.4442 0.9558
(0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)***
LNMEYEAR 0.2628 0.2824 0.3158
(0.014)** (0.011)** (0.006)***
LNMEYEAR*HT −1.0891 −0.8982 −1.1652
(0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)***
 −0.8209 −0.6157 −0.8493
(0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)***
DTAB −4.7435 −3.8069 −4.2568
(0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)
LNTAB −0.1625 −0.2530 −0.1594
(0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)***
Cons 6.5254 7.0833 2.7819
(0.000)***1751 (0.000)*** (0.037)**
Country dummies (sig.) Yes
Sector dummies (sig.) Yes
Year dummies (sig.) Yes
Wald test 1751.93 973.82 2033.99
(0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)***
AR (1) 1.08 1.08 1.04
(0.279) (0.278) (0.300)
AR (2) 0.95 0.95 0.95
(0.341) (0.344) (0.343)
Hansen test 181.73 173.56 159.17
(0.691) (0.734) (0.931)
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t* Signiﬁcant at 10% level.
** Signiﬁcant at 5% level.
*** Signiﬁcant at 1% level.
nowledge (Coles et al., 2008). Thepositive effect of insiders onper-
ormance supports the hypothesis that including managers on the
oard is valuable, as they can provide the information required and
hey can share itwith the outsiders’ information in order to conduct
nhanced governance.
.2. Robustness analysis
We examine the robustness of our ﬁndings running alternative
stimations of our empirical model. We divide the sample in terms
f the HT variable and re-estimate the model for each sub-sample
Table 7). The ﬁndings support the main hypothesis regarding the
nvolvement of outsiders and insiders inHTandnotHTﬁrms.When
ﬁrm runs its business in a sector where acquiring and passing on
ighly specialized information are important, thepresence of insid-
rs on the board is especially valuable (Harris andRaviv, 2008). This
ind of directors and their knowledge are well valued in ﬁrms fac-
ng complex environments with high needs for knowledge (Coles
t al., 2008). This result supports the conclusion that the presence
f insiders can be valuable because they enjoy easier access to the
nformation concerning the features of thebusiness, and such infor-
ation can be sharing with the board members in order to advise
anagement more efﬁciently. It seems more likely that the board
ill beable toadvisemoreeffectively if theCEOprovesmorewilling
o share information.We also exanimate the sensitivity of results taking in account
the corporate ownership structure of ﬁrm (Table 8). The owner-
ship is relevant because an important block of ownership around
the main shareholder or shareholders may prove decisive in solv-
ing the problem of supervising manager behavior and could lead to
the board playing a predominantly advisory role. Thus, we use the
dummy variable CONTROLLER that takes the value of one if over
25% of the average ownership is in the hands of the main share-
holder during the period for which observations exist for a speciﬁc
ﬁrm, and zero otherwise. We reestimate our model including this
variable. The ﬁndings are similar to the previous one showing the
different impact of board composition on performance. Thus, the
percentageof outsiders showsanegative (positive) impact onvalue
for ﬁrms belonging to high-tech (no high-tech) industries. This
result reveals again that there is no unique and optimal board com-
position, and that outsider–insider combinations do not respond
not only to monitoring reasoning but also to other motivations
as advising managers. The effect of a concentrated ownership on
performance is positive and signiﬁcant in all estimations.
As the effect of board composition on value, justiﬁed as a trade-
off between monitoring and advising, is the main result of our
paper, we run new estimations changing the measure of board
composition. Instead of using the proportion of outsiders (OUT-
PRO), we use the quotient of insiders over outsiders (INSOUT). This
variable could capture the effect of board composition changes
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mn value in a similar but different way. We use the same inter-
ctive procedure to estimate the effect of such variable on value
epending on the belonging of a ﬁrm to high-tech industry (HT).
he results in Table 9 are coherentwith the previous ones. Theposi-
ive and signiﬁcant estimated coefﬁcient of INSOUT*HT reveals that
he presence of insiders is well valued in ﬁrms where the recollec-
ion and processing of information (knowledge) are key points of
usiness. This ﬁnding challenges the idea that outsiders dominated
oards provide a better performance at all, and it is coherent with
ecent literature supporting the trade-off between insiders andout-
iders on board. In contrast, the negative and signiﬁcant coefﬁcient
f INSOUT for non-tech ﬁrms could reﬂect the less importance of
nsiders on board because of the less advising needs or the big-
er monitoring needs. These results are robust to the inclusion of
ountry and year effects, and changes in the division of the sample.
hether we divide the sample in high-tech ﬁrms (HT=1) and non
igh-tech ﬁrms (HT=0), the results of board are robust with the
revious showed. For the sake of brevity, we do not report them
ere.
We run additional estimations to control for other factors. One
f them is based on the approval of codes of board in the ana-
yzed countries. We take into account the approval of a new code
f board because it could inﬂuence on the boards, on other gover-
ancemechanisms, andonperformance.Wedeﬁne several dummy
ariables (CCG) that take the value of 1 from the date that the code
s approved in each country, and 0 otherwise. Again, the results (no
eported for the sake of brevity) show that when the advising is
specially relevant because of the knowledge needs in high-tech
ndustries, larger and less independent boards prove more valu-
ble. Moreover, a more proactive board also has a positive impact
n performance.
Despite thepreviouslyﬁlteredoutliers,weutilized anadditional
obust analysis using a winsorize process. Winsorize is the pro-
ess of taking non-missing values of a variable and generating a
ew variable which is identical to the original except that the high-
st and lowest h values are replaced by the next values counting
nwards from the extremes.5 Again, the results support the differ-
nt role of boards according to a company’s monitoring or advising
eeds. For the sake of brevity, we do not report them here.
. Conclusions
We explore a speciﬁc context that may have a great impact on
he board’s dedication to the task of advising and monitoring, and
n its subsequent effectiveness, the degree of involvement in high-
ech sectors. We do not overlook the fact that the structure and
omposition of the board itself may be determined by performance
swell as thenatureof theboardand theﬁrminwhich it is involved.
e address the endogenous nature of the intervening variables by
sing the generalized method of moments (GMM) together with
he panel method.
To achieve our goals we use a sample of 435 European ﬁrms and
800 observations from Spain, France, Italy, and the UK. Our sam-
le period covers between 1996 and 2005. The ﬁndings from our
mpirical research highlight the signiﬁcant differences in the link
etween board structure and performance in each of the settings
e examine. We ﬁnd that in ﬁrms belonging to high-tech sectors,
he proportion of insiders positively impact value, as compared to
on high-tech ﬁrms. We show that the advisory role takes prece-
ence over the monitoring function in settings where acquiring
nd conveying speciﬁc knowledge are particularly valued.Manage-
ent’s propensity to supply information to the board and efﬁcient
5 It was created and implemented in Stata by Cox (1998).advising is strengthened in larger boards and in boards with a
greater proportion of insiders.
Our research highlights the importance of suitably contextual-
izing any assessment of boards of directors as business governance
mechanisms. It also emphasizes the need to take into account the
differing functions these boards may carry out. Although it is clear
that much work still remains to be done, the relevance of one func-
tion or another, depending on the contexts in hand, forces us to
reconsider and reshape the empirical links traditionally evidenced
in ﬁnancial literature between performance and board structure.
This fresh view might prove useful in improving and specify-
ing recommendations included in Codes of Good Practices and
might draw attention to the different marginal value of monitor-
ing and advising, challenging the belief that one size (composition)
ﬁts all.
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